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1 Introduction
Governments around the world are currently introducing or are considering the introduc-
tion of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) as a supplement to or a (at least partial) sub-
stitute for the existing public pension system. Due to population ageing, the current benefit-
wage ratios of pay-as-you-go financed retirement systems are hardly sustainable. It is hoped
that individual accounts reduce labor and capital market distortions and accumulate addi-
tional private savings to secure the standard of living of future workers and retirees without
harming current generations, see the discussion in Feldstein and Liebman (2002).
However, the economic rational for the shift towards funded pensions is not undisputed.
Critics point out that such a reform hardly improves economic efficiency. Welfare gains of
future cohorts are mainly generated by welfare losses of transitional generations. In addi-
tion, they claim that it is misleading to analyze social security in the framework of fully
rational decision making and a set of complete markets. Among other reasons, social secu-
rity was introduced in the first place to prevent myopic individuals from inadequate savings
for retirement and to substitute the missing market for annuities, see Lindbeck and Persson
(2003, p. 77) or Diamond (2004, p. 4). Therefore, recent attempts by Diamond and Ko¨szegi
(2003), Cremer, De Donder, Maldonado and Pestieau (2007) or Hurst and Willen (2007) ana-
lyze social security design issues inmodels with short-sighted and fully rational individuals.
The present paper adds to this literature by comparing the economic consequences of so-
cial security funding with individual accounts in a general equilibrium life-cycle model
populated by either rational or hyperbolic individuals. Our model features idiosyncratic
income and life-span uncertainty, missing private annuity markets and credit constrained
consumers. Our initial equilibrium is calibrated to the German economy, since the German
pension system offers a special case for social security funding issues. Due to the strong
tax-benefit linkage of the current paygo system, intra-cohort redistribution is fairly low. In
addition, current paygo benefits are tax deferred in Germany such that the tax structure is
not altered by the introduction of IRAs. As a consequence, our discussion could (mostly)
abstract from labor supply distortions and insurance effects against income shocks. Instead,
we isolate the commitment effect, the insurance provision against longevity and the liquid-
ity effect of both social security and individual accounts.
Three major findings from the paper are important for the current political debate. First,
in our most preferred calibration the commitment effect of social security roughly amounts
to 1 percent of aggregate resources. As a consequence, the elimination (or privatization) of
social security without individual accounts would reduce economic efficiency in the myopic
economy. In the case of rational individuals, the liquidity gain and the improved insurance
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provision of the tax system dominate the (negative) effect from the eliminated annuity pro-
vision so that economic efficiency increases slightly by 0.2 percent of aggregate resources.
Second, our simulations demonstrate that individual accounts which are annuitized after
retirement are able to replace the commitment technology of social security for hyperbolic
individuals. Therefore, funding social security with individual accounts increases economic
efficiency significantly by roughly 0.7 percent of aggregate resources in both cases consid-
ered. However, annuitization reduces the welfare gain of future generations substantially,
since it dampens accidental bequests. Third, the reported efficiency gains from the introduc-
tion of IRAs are mainly due to the improved liquidity of younger households. Consequently,
mandatory accounts would (almost) completely eliminate them. This reasoning also applies
to hyperbolic consumers who additionally use the accounts to commit themselves.
The next section discusses the related literature on IRAs and social security funding. Section
3 describes the structure of our simulation model and the computational algorithm. Section
4 explains the calibration of the initial equilibrium while section 5 presents our simulation
results. The last section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Various studies have already quantified the growth, distributional and efficiency implica-
tions of government sponsored retirement accounts. Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994) examine
the effectiveness of individual retirement accounts in the U.S. Applying a partial equilibrium
life-cycle model with income and life span uncertainty, they compute the optimal individual
saving behavior for alternative contribution limits and withdrawal rates. Their simulations
indicate that individuals will mainly substitute from liquid savings in the short run and in-
crease their aggregate savings only slightly in the long run. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman
(1998) extend this approach by considering consumers with hyperbolic discount functions.
Their analysis confirms that tax-favored retirement schemes have a bigger impact on hy-
perbolic consumers, since the latter value commitment. Love (2006) introduces job loss and
unemployment insurance (UI) into this framework in order to measure the extent of precau-
tionary savings in U.S. accounts. Since withdrawals before retirement are possible with a
modest penalty, he finds that 401(k) plans may also serve as a precautionary savings vehi-
cle. There is a positive effect on aggregate savings which decreases with the generosity of
the UI system. Love (2007) extends the analysis of Engen et al. (1994) by quantifying the
impact of employer matching, vesting periods and withdrawal penalties on individual sav-
ing behavior in 401(k) plans. Finally, Pries (2007) focusses on the welfare and distributional
consequences of switching from social security to a mandatory system of so-called personal
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retirement accounts (PRAs). The study highlights the importance of liquidity effects. In
order to improve life-cycle consumption smoothing and the accumulation of precautionary
savings, it argues in favor of a PRA-system where contribution rates increase with age.
Whereas the partial equilibrium approach of Pries (2007) does not consider how to finance
the currently existing social security liabilities, the present study includes such issues by
applying a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations which was pioneered
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). This approach has been applied in numerous quantita-
tive studies on social security funding. Starting with I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu and Joines
(1995), the model has been extended to include individual income and mortality risk, in
order to quantify the insurance properties of the public sector.1
I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (1998) evaluate the long-run effects of IRAs on the U.S. capital stock
for various contribution limits and tax savings instruments. They conclude that about 9
percent of IRA contributions during the 80ies constituted additional savings which raised
the capital stock by about 6 percent. Fehr, Habermann and Kindermann (2008a) as well as
Fehr and Habermann (2008a) extend this analysis by including the transition to the new
long-run equilibrium and computing the welfare and efficiency consequences. Whereas
Fehr et al. (2008a) concentrate on the effects of contribution ceilings and alternative tax
arrangements, Fehr andHabermann (2008a) analyze some specific features of the recent IRA
introduction in Germany such as mandatory annuitization. Both studies confirm the steady-
state growth effects of IRAs from I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (1998) and indicate a significant increase
in future generations’ welfare. However, since aggregate efficiency is hardly affected, future
welfare gains come at the cost of transitional welfare losses. If accounts are annuitized,
future generations might even lose due to the reduction of accidental bequest.
Fuster, I˙mrohorog˘lu and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2008) present a first approach, where individual re-
tirement accounts are introduced as a substitute for (and not as a supplement to) the exist-
ing social security system. Their model features two-sided altruism where individual life
expectancy and income are positively correlated. Starting from a benchmark which reflects
the existing U.S. pay-as-you-go social security system, they either eliminate the existing sys-
tem or substitute half of the contributions by mandatory savings in private accounts which
are either annuitized or not after retirement. While all reforms induce an increase in the
steady-state capital stock between 6 and 9 percent, the mandatory saving programs outper-
forms the full privatization policy in terms of long-run capital and consumption growth. As
in Fehr and Habermann (2008a) annuitization decreases accidental bequest. However, long-
run welfare does not necessarily decrease due to annuitization. Households without parents
1Older numerical simulation studies are surveyed in Lindbeck and Persson (2003). For the more recent
literature see Krueger (2006).
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alive are hurt by annuitization and even prefer a full privatization policy, since mandatory
savings increase their liquidity constraints. On the other hand, most households with both
parents and children benefit from a mandatory saving programmwith annuitized pay-outs,
since parents like to hold annuities during retirement. Consequently, Fuster et al. (2008)
demonstrate that annuitization could affect different household types within a cohort quite
differently. However, since the study only considers long-run equilibria, the reported wel-
fare effects could be due to intergenerational redistribution or due to increased efficiency.
The present study considers the transition to the new long-run equilibrium in order to ana-
lyze this issue in more detail.
Our study is also related to recent general equilibrium studies which analyze the welfare ef-
fects of social security funding in models where individuals exhibit problems of self-control.
While I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (2003) consider social security in a model where consumers exhibit
time-inconsistent preferences, Kumru and Thanopoulos (2008) model preferences where
agents are tempted to consume in every period. Although individuals with problems of self-
control value social security either as a commitment device or a device which reduces the
cost of temptation, both studies find that the introduction of social security still decreases
long-run welfare for reasonable short-run discount rates. However, both studies neglect
transitional cost (or benefits) and therefore fail to isolate the exact commitment effect which
social security provides to short-sighted consumers. The latter is done in Fehr et al. (2008b)
where we compare the elimination of social security in an economy populated by either
rational or hyperbolic consumers. The present study directly extends our previous one by
considering the introduction of an IRA system as a substitute for social security. Here we
extend the existing literature by documenting the important role of IRAs as a commitment
device and by analyzing the implications of mandatory accounts.
3 The model economy
3.1 Demographics and intracohort heterogeneity
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals which may
live up to a maximum possible lifespan of J periods. At the beginning of each period, a new
generation is born where we assume a population growth rate of n. Since individuals face
lifespan uncertainty, ψj < 1 denotes the time-invariant conditional survival probability from
age j− 1 to age j with ψJ+1 = 0.
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Our model is solved recursively. Consequently, an age-j agent faces the state vector
zj = (aj, aRj , epj, ej) (1)
where aj ∈ A = [a¯, a¯] denotes (liquid) assets held at the beginning of age j, a
R
j ∈ R = [a¯
R, a¯R]
are assets in individual retirement accounts held at the beginning of age j, epj ∈ P = [ep, ep]
defines the agent’s accumulated earning points for public pension claims and ej ∈ Ej =
[ej, ej] is the individual productivity at age j.
The productivity state is assumed to follow a first-order Markov process described in more
detail below. Consequently, each age-j cohort is fragmented into subgroups ξ(zj), according
to the initial distribution at age j = 1, mortality, population growth, the Markov process and
optimal household decisions. Let X(zj) be the corresponding cumulated measure to ξ(zj).
Hence, ∫
E1
dX(z1) = 1 with z1 = (0, 0, 0, e1) (2)
must hold, since we have normalized the cohort size of newborns to be unity. Let 1h=x be
an indicator function that returns 1 if h = x and 0 if h = x. Let Zt = (ξt(zj),Ψt) denote
the state of the economy at the beginning of period t, where Ψt defines the known policy
schedule of the government at t. Then, the law of motion of the measure of households is,
for j ∈ (1, . . . , J),
ξt+1(zj+1) =
ψj+1
1+ n
∫
A×R×P×Ej
1aj+1=aj+1(zj,Zt)
× 1aRj+1=aRj+1(zj,Zt) × 1epj+1=epj+1(zj,Zt)πj(ej+1|ej)dXt(zj), (3)
where πj(ej+1|ej) denotes the probability at age j to experience productivity ej+1 in the next
period if the current productivity is ej.
In the following, we will omit the time index t and the state indices zj and Zt for every
variable whenever possible. Agents are then only distinguished according to their age j.
3.2 The individual decision problem
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested
CES utility function. We distinguish between rational and hyperbolic consumers. The for-
mer exhibit time-consistent preferences and consequently do not regret their previous de-
cisions in the future. Following the seminal work of Strotz (1956), we model the decision
problem of a hyperbolic consumer as an intrapersonal game between a sequence of ”selves”
with conflicting preferences. Taking the strategies of his future selves as given, the current
self picks a strategy that is optimal from his own perspective.
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The consumer at age j and state zj in period t first has to forecast his future actions. He
believes that his future self (who is at age j + 1) will choose consumption, leisure and IRA
savings in order to maximize the objective function
max
cˆj+1,ˆj+1,sˆj+1
{
u(cˆj+1, ˆj+1) + βˆδ
[
ψj+2EVˆ (zj+2,Zt+2) + (1− ψj+2)B(qˆj+2)
]}
. (4)
Since life-span is uncertain, the (believed) expected value function EVˆ (·) of the future is
weighted with the survival probability ψj+2 while utility from (believed) bequests qˆj+2 is
weighted with the probability to die.2 The expectation operator E in (4) indicates that future
utilities are computed over the distribution of ej+2. Hence,
EVˆ (zj+2,Zt+2) =
∫
Ej+2
Vˆ (zj+2,Zt+2)
1− 1γΠj+1(dej+2|ej+1), (5)
where γ defines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and Πj+1(ej+2|ej+1) denotes the
cumulative density function of the respective probability πj+1(ej+2|ej+1) to experience pro-
ductivity ej+2 in the next period if the current productivity is ej+1. Utility from leaving
bequest is simply computed from
B(qˆj+2) = μ qˆ
1− 1γ
j+2 μ ≥ 0, (6)
where μ defines the strength of the bequest motive. In (4) expected utility is discounted with
δ and the hyperbolic parameter βˆ which allows to distinguish between so called ”naive” and
”sophisticated” hyperbolic consumers, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The former think
that their future selves will behave in a time-consistent manner despite the fact that they
have consistently violated this belief in the past, i.e. βˆ = 1. The latter correctly foresee that
their future selves will also behave in a time-inconsistent way, i.e. βˆ = β where β defines
the discount rate of the current selves. Consequently, cˆj+1, ˆj+1 and sˆj+1 denote the believe
of the current self about his future actions.
The value function Vˆ (·) for future beliefs (with cˆj+1, ˆj+1, sˆj+1 and qˆj+2 from (4)) is computed
for any age j+ 1 in period t+ 1 from
Vˆ (zj+1,Zt+1) = u(cˆj+1, ˆj+1) + δ
[
ψj+2EVˆ (zj+2,Zt+2) + (1− ψj+2)B(qˆj+2)
]
. (7)
The current self at age j = 1, . . . , J in period tmaximizes the objective function
max
cj,j,sj
{
u(cj, j) + βδ
[
ψj+1EVˆ (zj+1,Zt+1) + (1− ψj+1)B(qˆj+1)
]}
, (8)
2This type of bequest motive has been called warm glow (De Nardi, 2004). Fuster et al. (2008) model inter-
generational links quite differently.
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which already reflects the believes about his/ her future behavior. Note that the decision
functions cj(zj,Zt), j(zj,Zt) and sj(zj,Zt) now denote the actual behavior of the agent. They
are also used to compute agent’s welfare, i.e.
V (zj,Zt) = u(cj, j) + δ
[
ψj+1EV (zj+1,Zt+1) + (1− ψj+1)B(qj+1)
]
. (9)
The time-inconsistency in preferences is evident from the fact that the β and βˆ terms appear
in the decision problems (4) and (8) but not in the calculation of value functions (7) and
(9). It should also be clear that for β = βˆ the decision and value functions of the beliefs
cˆj, ˆj, sˆj and Vˆ and the respective functions of the actual behavior cj, j, sj and V coincide.
Consequently, sophisticated hyperbolic consumers (where β = βˆ < 1) behave differently
compared to time-consistent consumers (i.e. where β = βˆ = 1) but the solution algorithm is
quite similar.3
Finally, the period utility function is defined by
u(cj, j) =
1
1− 1γ
[
(cj)
1− 1ρ + α(j)
1− 1ρ
] 1− 1γ
1− 1ρ , (10)
where ρ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
at each age j while α is the age-independent leisure preference parameter.
Current selves maximize (8) subject to the budget constraint
aj+1 = aj(1+ r) + wj + pj + bj + vj − sj − τ min[wj; 2w¯]− T(yj)− (1+ τc)cj (11)
with a1 = aJ+1 = 0 and aj ≥ 0 ∀ j. In addition to interest income from savings raj, house-
holds receive gross labor income wj = w(1− j)ej during their working period as well as
public pensions pj during retirement. As time endowment is normalized to one, w defines
the wage rate for effective labor. At specific ages, households also receive accidental be-
quests bj and in specific simulations they receive (or have to pay) lump-sum transfers vj
which are explained below. Households contribute to or withdraw from retirement accounts
sj and have to pay social security contributions and income taxes. We eliminate the liquid-
ity of retirement accounts during employment completely4 and do not allow for positive
contributions after retirement, i.e.
sj ≥ 0 if j < jR and sj ≤ 0 if j ≥ jR. (12)
3For naive hyperbolic consumers (i.e. where β < 1 and βˆ = 1) the decision functions of believes (4)
and actual behavior (8) do not coincide so that the computational algorithm has to be specified differently.
In the following we only report results with sophisticated hyperbolic consumers. The difference with naive
hyperbolic consumers is only minor.
4Consequently, in contrast to Love (2006), accounts will not accumulate precautionary savings.
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Contributions at a rate τ are paid to the public pension system up to a ceiling which amounts
to the double of average income w¯. Income taxes depend on taxable income yj and the tax
schedule T(·) which is explained below. Finally, the price of consumption goods cj includes
consumption taxes τc.
Retirement account assets accumulate according to
aRj+1 = a
R
j (1+ rj) +min[sj, sˆj] with rj =
1+ r
max[ωj,ψj]
− 1, (13)
where aR1 = 0 and a
R
j ≥ 0 ∀ j. Without annuitization at age j, we set ωj = 1 so that
the survival probability ψj has no effect on the individual return, i.e. rj = r. If retirement
account assets are annuitized at age j, we set ωj = 0 so that rj > r. Contributions cannot
exceed the contribution limit sˆj which is specified below. After retirement (i.e. j ≥ jR and
sj ≤ 0) we have to distinguish two cases: First, without mandatory annuitization, retired
households can decide how much to withdraw. Second, with mandatory annuitization, we
follow Fuster et al. (2008) and assume that retirees receive a fixed benefit, depending on
their wealth at the beginning of retirement aRjR :
sj = sjR = −
(1+ rjR)a
R
jR
∑Jj=jRΠ
j
i=jR+1
(1+ ri)−1
. (14)
Accumulated earning points of the pension system depend on the relative income position
wj/ w¯ of the worker at working age j < jR. Since the contribution ceiling is fixed at the
double of average income w¯, maximum earning points collected per year are 2. Therefore,
earning points accumulate according to
epj+1 = epj + νmin[wj/ w¯; 2], (15)
where ep1 = 0. The credit factor ν is set at 1 in the initial equilibrium and then reduced to
zero by the reform.
Ourmodel abstracts from private annuitymarkets. Consequently, private assets of all agents
who died are aggregated and then distributed among all working age cohorts following an
exogenous age- and productivity-dependent distribution scheme Γj(ej), i.e.
bj(zj,Zt+1) =
Γj(ej)
1+ n
J
∑
i=1
(1− ψi+1)
∫
A×R×P×Ei
qi+1(zi,Zt)dXt(zi) ∀ j < jR, (16)
where qi+1(zi ,Zt) = (1+ r)[ai+1(zi,Zt) + ωi+1aRi+1(zi,Zt)(1− τb)]. The age distribution of
bequests is computed in the initial steady state, where we assume that heirs always receive
assets of the generation which was 25 years older. Since bequest can only be received during
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employment, we adjust this rule at the beginning and the end of employment. Within a
generation bequests are distributed proportional to the current productivity level ej, which
highlights their stochastic nature and also reflects empirical evidence.5 Finally, inheritances
from IRAs are due to a specific inheritance tax τb, since they were accumulated tax free.
3.3 The production side
Firms in this economy use capital and labor to produce a single good according to a Cobb-
Douglas production technology Yt = Kεt L
1−ε
t where Yt,Kt and Lt are aggregate output,
capital and labor in period t, respectively, ε is capital’s share in production, and  defines
a technology parameter. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δk and firms have to pay
corporate taxes Tk,t = τk
[
Yt − wtLt − δkKt
]
, where a time-invariant corporate tax rate τk is
applied to output net of labor costs and depreciation. Firms maximize profits renting capital
and hiring labor from households so that net marginal products equal rt the interest rate for
capital and wt the wage rate for effective labor.
3.4 The government sector
Our model distinguishes between the tax system and the pension system. In each period
t, the government issues new debt (1+ n)BG,t+1 − BG,t and collects taxes from households
and firms in order to finance general government expenditure G which is fixed per capita as
well as interest payments on its debt, i.e.
(1+ n)BG,t+1 − BG,t+ Ty,t + Tk,t + Tb,t + τc,tCt = G+ rtBG,t. (17)
Revenues of income and bequest taxation are computed from
Ty,t =
J
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
T(yj(zj,Zt))dXt(zj)
and
Tb,t = τb
J
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
ωj+1(1− ψj+1)(1+ rt)aRj+1(zj,Zt)dXt(zj)
and Ct defines aggregate consumption (see (26)).
We assume that contributions to public pensions are exempted from tax while benefits are
fully taxed. Consequently, taxable income yj is computed from gross labor income net of
5De Nardi (2004) highlights the link between individual productivity and inheritance. Fehr et al. (2008a)
also report the consequences of alternative bequest distributions.
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pension contributions, a flexible work related allowance d(wj), capital income and – after
retirement – public pensions. By means of θ, we can distinguish between fully taxed and
tax deferred retirement accounts. In the former case (i.e. when θ = 1) savings in retire-
ment accounts are taxed as ordinary savings, whereas in the latter case (i.e. when θ = 0)
contributions to retirement accounts are tax deductible (up to the contribution limit) and
withdrawals after retirement have to be fully taxed. Hence,
yj = max[wj − τ min[wj, 2w¯]− d(wj); 0] + r(aj + θaRj ) + pj − (1− θ)min[sj, sˆj]. (18)
Given taxable income, we apply the progressive tax code of 2005 (including a solidarity
surcharge τz of 5.5 percent) in Germany, i.e. T(yj) = (1 + τz)T05(yj). After the policy
reform, the intertemporal budget of the government is balanced by a one time adjustment
of the consumption tax rate.
In each period, the pension system pays old-age benefits and collects payroll contributions
from wage income below the contribution ceiling of 2w¯. Individual pension benefits pj of
a retiree at age j ≥ jR in a specific year are computed from the product of his/ her earning
points epjR he/ she has accumulated at retirement and the actual pension amount (APA) per
earning point:
pj = epjR ×APA. (19)
The budget of the pension systemmust be balanced in the long-run. Consequently, we allow
in the transitional periods for new pension debt (1+ n)BP,t+1 − BP,t in order to balance the
periodical budgets
(1+ n)BP,t+1 − BP,t = rtBP,t+ PBt − τtPCt, (20)
where
PBt =
J
∑
j=jR
∫
A×R×P×Ej
pj(zj,Zt)dXt(zj) and
PCt =
jR−1
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
min[wj(zj,Zt); 2w¯(Zt)]dXt(zj)
define aggregate pensions benefits and the contribution base in period t. In the initial long-
run equilibrium BP = 0 and the contribution rate τ is computed endogenously. After the
reform we adjust the contribution rate once to balance the intertemporal budget.
3.5 Welfare and efficiency calculation
The welfare criterion we use to assess the policy reform is ex-ante expected utility of an
agent, before his productivity level is revealed (i.e. looking upon her life behind the Rawl-
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sian veil of ignorance). Similar to (5), expected utility of a newborn in period t is computed
from
EV (z1,Zt) =
∫
E1
V (z1,Zt)
1− 1γdXt(z1) with z1 = (0, 0, 0, e1).
In order to compare the welfare for a specific individual before and after the reform, we fol-
low Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 87) and compute the proportional increase (or decrease)
in consumption and leisure φ which would make an agent in the initial equilibrium as well
off as after the reform, i.e.
EV (zj,Zt) = EV (zj,Z0, φ),
where
V (zj,Z0, φ) = u(cj(1+φ), j(1+φ))+ δ
[
ψj+1EV (zj+1,Z0, φ)+ (1−ψj+1)B(qj+1(1+φ))
]
.
We can compare all existing cohorts in the reform year Z1 and all newborn cohorts along
the transition path with the respective cohorts in the initial equilibrium Z0, since they have
identical individual state variables. Due to the homogeneity of the utility function (10) and
(3.5) we have EV (zj,Z0, φ) = (1+ φ)EV (zj,Z0). Therefore, for all agents living in the initial
equilibrium the necessary increase (or decrease) in percent of resources is[
EV (zj+1,Z1)
EV (zj+1,Z0)
− 1
]
× 100. (21)
A value of 1.0 indicates that this agent would need one percent more resources in the ini-
tial long-run equilibrium to attain the expected utility level he receives after the policy re-
form. Within each cohort, we aggregate for each productivity level the percentage changes
across asset levels and pension points in order to derive the average (uncompensated) wel-
fare changes for alternative income classes which are reported in the following tables. For
newborn generations who enter the labor market during the transition we can only report
the ex-ante welfare change for the whole cohort. Consequently, in order to compare the
intra-cohort welfare consequences of future born agents, we compute the ex-post welfare
change after the initial productivity level has been revealed.
In order to asses the aggregate efficiency consequences, we introduce a Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 62f.) as well as
Nishiyama and Smetters (2005, 2007), Fehr and Habermann (2008a) and Fehr et al. (2008)
in a separate simulation. The LSRA treats those cohorts already existing in the initial equi-
librium and newborn cohorts differently. To already existing cohorts it pays a lump-sum
transfer (or levies a lump-sum tax) vj(zj,Z1), j > 1, to bring their expected utility level af-
ter the reform back to the level of the initial equilibrium EV (zj,Z0). Since utility depends
on age and state, these transfers (or taxes) have to be computed for every agent in the first
year of the transition. Consequently, after compensation, their relative welfare change is
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zero. Those who enter the labor market in period t ≥ 1 of the transition receive a transfer
v1(z1,Zt,V ∗) which guaranties them an expected utility level V ∗. Note that the transfers
v1(z1,Zt,V ∗) may differ among future cohorts but the expected utility level V ∗ is identical
for all. The value of the latter is chosen by requiring that the present value of all LSRA
transfers is zero:6
J
∑
j=2
∫
A×R×P×Ej
vj(zj,Z1)dX1(zj) +
∞
∑
t=1
v1(z1,Zt,V ∗)Πt−1s=1(1+ rs)
−1 = 0.
In the first period of the transition the LSRA builds up debt (or assets) from
(1+ n)BRA,2 =
J
∑
j=2
∫
A×R×P×Ej
vj(zj,Z1)dX1(zj) + v1(z1,Z1,V ∗)
which has to be adjusted in each future period according to
(1+ n)BRA,t+1 = (1+ rt)BRA,t − v1(z1,Zt,V ∗). (22)
Of course, LSRA assets are also included in the asset market equilibrium condition (27).
Given the compensated expected utility V ∗ of newborns, we compute the (compensated)
relative change in initial resources whichwould be required in order to attain V ∗. If the latter
is positive (negative) all households in the reform year who lived in the previous period
would be as well off as before the reform and all current and future newborn households
would be strictly better (worse) off. Hence, the new policy is Pareto improving (inferior)
after lump-sum redistributions.
3.6 Equilibrium conditions
Given the fiscal policy Ψt = {G, T(y), BG,t, BRA,t, τc,t, τb,t, τt, sˆ, θ,ω} ∀ t, a recursive equilib-
rium path is a set of value functions {V (zj,Zt)}Jj=1, household decision rules {cj(zj,Zt),
j(zj,Zt), sj(zj,Zt)}Jj=1, distributions of unintended bequest {bj(zj,Zt)}Jj=1, measures of house-
holds {ξt(zj)}Jj=1 and relative prices of labor and capital {wt, rt} so that the following con-
ditions are satisfied ∀ t:
1. Households’ decision rules solve the household’s decision problem (8) subject to the
given constraints (11), (13) and (15).
6In order to avoid that transfers have liquidity effects at young ages, they are actually given (with interest)
to cohorts when they retire or later. Further information on the computation of V ∗ is available upon request.
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2. Factor prices are competitive, i.e.
wt = (1− ε)
(
Kt
Lt
)ε
, (23)
rt = ε
(
Lt
Kt
)1−ε
− δk. (24)
3. In the closed economy aggregation holds,
Lt =
J
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
[1− (zj,Zt)]ej dXt(zj), (25)
Ct =
J
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
cj(zj,Zt)dXt(zj), (26)
Kt =
J
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
(aj + aRj )dXt(zj)− BG,t− BP,t − BRA,t, (27)
while in the small open economy aggregate capital is derived from (24).
4. The laws of motion (2) and (3) for the measure of households hold.
5. Unintended bequests satisfy
(1+ n)
jR−1
∑
j=1
∫
A×R×P×Ej
bj(zj,Zt+1)dXt+1(zj) =
J
∑
i=1
∫
A×R×P×Ei
qi+1(zi,Zt)(1− ψi+1)dXt(zi). (28)
6. The budgets of the government (17), the pension system (20) and the redistribution
authority (22) are balanced in the long-run.
7. The goods market clears, i.e.
Yt = Ct + (1+ n)Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + G (closed economy)
Yt = Ct + (1+ n)Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt + G+ NXt (open economy)
with NXt as net exports in period t.
3.7 The computational algorithm
Our simulations start from initial steady states which reflect the German social security sys-
tem. The computation method follows the Gauss-Seidel procedure of Auerbach and Kot-
likoff (1987). We start with a guess for aggregate variables, bequest distribution and policy
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parameters. Then we compute the factor prices and the individual decision rules and value
functions. This involves a discretization of the state space which is explained in the ap-
pendix. Next we obtain the distribution of households and aggregate assets, labor supply
and consumption as well as the social security tax rate and the consumption tax rate that
balances government’s budget. This information allows us to update the initial guesses.
The procedure is repeated until the initial guesses and the resulting values for capital, labor,
bequests and endogenous taxes have sufficiently converged.
Next we solve for the transition path where social security is completely eliminated. We
assume that the transition between the initial and the final steady state takes 4× J periods.
With alternative policy parameters we assume in the first guess that aggregate values and
bequests of the initial equilibrium would remain constant along the transition. Then we
update for each period of the transition the individual and aggregate variables until we
reach convergence.
4 Calibration of the initial equilibrium
Table 1 reports the central parameters of the model. In order to reduce computational time,
each model period covers five years. Agents start life at age 20 (j = 1), are forced to retire
at age 60 (jR = 9) and face a maximum possible life span of 100 years (J = 16). The popu-
lation growth rate is set at n = 0.05 which roughly corresponds to an annual growth rate of
1 percent. Since population growth is close to zero in Germany, this figure mainly reflects
labor productivity growth. The conditional survival probabilities ψj are computed from the
year 2000 Life Tables for Germany reported in Bomsdorf (2003). With respect to the prefer-
ence parameters we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ to 0.5, the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution ρ to 0.6 and the leisure preference parameter α to 1.5. This is within
the range of commonly used values (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, or Fehr, 1999) and
yields a compensated labor supply elasticity of 0.32 in our benchmark. With respect to the
time preference rates β and δ we distinguish two combinations which both yield a realistic
capital to income ratio. Following Angeletos et al. (2001, p. 54) we assume that the rational
consumer (i.e. β = 1) has a lower discount factor δ than the hyperbolic consumer. In order
to calibrate a realistic capital to output ratio, the discount factor for the rational consumer is
set at 0.986 which implies an annual discount rate of about 0.5 percent. Next we specify for
the hyperbolic consumer β = 0.75 and set δ = 1.005 in order to calibrate the same capital-
output ratio. This calibration strategy follows Angeletos et al. (2001) and I˙mrohorog˘lu et
al. (2003, p. 763). While Angeletos et al. (2001) report that β = 0.7 is typically measured
in laboratory experiments, I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (2003) choose values between 0.6 and 0.9 for
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β and calibrate quite similar values for δ. Finally, we specify a bequest parameter μ = 0.5
which yields a realistic bequest level for Germany.
Table 1: Parameter selection
Demographic Preference Technology Government
parameters parameters parameters parameters
J = 16 γ = 0.5  = 1.5 τc = 0.17
jR = 9 ρ = 0.6 ε = 0.3 τk = 0.1
n = 0.05 α = 1.5 δk = 0.276 BG/ Y = 0.6
ψj :Bomsdorf (2003) β = 1.00/ δ = 0.986 d(wj) = 1200+ 0.04wj
β = 0.75/ δ = 1.005 T(y), APA see text
μ = 0.5
With respect to technology parameters we specify the general factor productivity  = 1.5 in
order to normalize labor income and set the capital share in production ε at 0.3. The annual
depreciation rate for capital is set at 5 percent which yields a periodic depreciation rate of
δk = 0.276. The annual APA value is chosen in order to derive a replacement rate of net
income of 75 percent, which yields a realistic contribution rate for Germany. As already ex-
plained, the taxation of gross income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close to the current
German income tax code and the marginal tax rate schedule T05 which was introduced in
2005. We assume that our households are married couples and apply the German income
splitting method. In addition, we consider a special allowance for labor income of d(wj)
which combines a fixed amount of 1200 e and an additional deduction of 4 percent of labor
income. Given taxable income yj the marginal tax rate rises linearly after the basic allowance
of 7800 e from 15 percent to maximum of 42 percent when yj passes 52.000 e. In addition to
the income tax payment, households pay a surcharge at rate 5.5 percent in the benchmark.
In the initial long-run equilibrium we assume a debt-to-output ratio of 60 percent, fix the
consumption and the corporate tax rate at 17 and 10 percent, respectively and compute G
endogenously to balance the budget.
In order to model the income process, we distinguish six productivity profiles across the life
cycle. Fehr (1999) has estimated five such profiles from data of the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP). We split up the profile of the lowest income class in order to improve
the income distribution. When an agent enters the labor market (at age 20-24) he belongs
to the lowest productivity level with a probability of 10 percent, to the second lowest again
with 10 percent and to higher levels with 20 percent, respectively. After the initial period,
agents change their productivity levels according to the age-specific Markov transition ma-
trices which are reported in the appendix. The latter are also computed from SOEP data for
different years between 1988 and 2003. Specifically, we sorted the primary earners of the
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years 1988, 1993 and 1998 into seven cohorts and divided them within each cohort into six
income classes. Then we compiled for each cohort and income class the respective income
classes of its members in the surveys of the years 1993, 1998 and 2003 in order to calculate
the age-specific transition matrices.
Table 2 reports the calibrated benchmark equilibria with either rational or sophisticated hy-
perbolic consumers and the respective figures for Germany in 2005. Both equilibria feature
a closed economy so that the interest rate is endogenous and the trade balance is zero. Since
preferences include a bequest motive, the reported bequest in Table 2 are partly accidental
due to missing annuity markets and partly intended as well. The equilibrium for hyperbolic
Table 2: The initial equilibrium
Rational Hyperbolic Germany
consumers consumers 2005
Calibration targets
Pension benefits (% of GDP) 13.1 13.1 12.3a
Pension contribution rate (in %) 19.5 19.5 19.5a
Tax revenues (in % of GDP) 20.7 20.7 20.2a
Capital-output ratio 2.9 2.9 2.9a
Other benchmark coefficients
Interest rate p.a. (in %) 4.0 4.0 –
Bequest (in % of GDP) 6.2 5.7 4.7-7.1b
Gini index net income 0.277 0.279 0.299c
Gini index wealth 0.554 0.555 0.613c
Borrowing constraints (in %)
age 20-24 40.0 40.0 10.0d
age 25-29 14.4 29.0 18.9d
age 30-34 6.6 6.6 18.9d
Source: aIdW (2008), bDIA (2002, p. 19), cDIW (2005), dSAVE survey.
consumers is computed with alternative values for δ and β. Hyperbolic consumers would
like to consume more when they are young compared to rational consumers. As a conse-
quence, borrowing constraints hit stronger when young and the bequest share of GDP is
slightly reduced.
In both equilibria we hit the target for the pension contribution rate of 19.5 percent. It is
useful to split up this contribution rate into its (implicit and age-specific) savings and tax
shares. The implicit savings rate τsj of age j is computed by dividing the present value of
benefits from one year of average contributions by the present value of average income at
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the time of retirement7, i.e.
τsj =
APA ∑Jk=jR Π
k
i=jR+1
(1+ ri)−1
w¯ΠjRi=j+1(1+ ri)
. (29)
Consequently, by investing at each age j the implicit savings rate in an annuitized plan, the
capital market would generate the same income stream as the contributions to the public
system, see Sinn (2000). As earning points don’t pay any interest, the implicit savings rate
increases with rising age. The implicit tax rate is then computed from the difference between
the contribution rate of 19.5 percent and the age-specific savings rate, i.e. τ˜j = τ − τsj (see
the solid line in Figure 1 for both savings and tax rate).
Figure 1: Implicit savings and tax rates
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5 Simulation results
This section presents our simulation results. In the first subsection we repeat the policy ex-
periment from Fehr et al. (2008b) and simply eliminate the public pension system. We then
combine this reform with an introduction of either voluntary or mandatory retirement ac-
counts. The last subsection presents some sensitivity calculations for alternative preference
parameters. If not stated otherwise, all considered reform experiments are simulated in a
small open economy.
7Fenge, U¨belmesser and Werding (2006) present similar calculations for Germany, while Bu¨tler (2002) de-
rives a more general formula.
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5.1 Pension funding without IRAs
In order to eliminate the existing pay-as-you-go financed pension system, we simply set
ν = 0 in equation (15). Consequently, individuals keep their existing earning points, but
do not accumulate additional ones in the future. Current and future pension benefits are
financed by a time- (and age-)invariant payroll tax rate, which is computed from the re-
spective intertemporal pension budget. On average, this payroll tax rate reflects implicit
taxes of the former PAYG-system, while the reduction reflects the average savings share,
see Sinn (2000). Similarly, the intertemporal government budget is balanced by a one-time
adjustment of the consumption tax rate. Therefore, annual budgets may include deficits
(surpluses) during the transition which are financed by (used to reduce) pension and gov-
ernment debt.
In order to clearly point out the implications of our pure pension funding exercise, Table 3
summarizes the effects of such a reform. There are five major points that come with the elim-
Table 3: Different implications of pure pension funding
Effect Implication
1. age-independent payroll-tax - labor supply distortions
2. switch from front- to back-loaded taxation - labor supply distortions
- higher insurance provision
3. loss of annuitization - loss of longevity insurance
- increased bequests
- loss of commitment device∗
4. no more mandatory savings - relax liquidity constraints
- loss of commitment device∗
5. missing withdrawal restrictions - loss of commitment device∗
∗ only applies to hyperbolic consumers
ination of the existing PAYG pension system. First, we make the implicit, age-dependent
tax rate of the retirement system explicit and age-independent (see dashed line in Figure
1). As labor supply elasticities usually rise with age, this effect causes higher distortions
and therefore a decline in overall labor supply. Second, sizing down tax deductible pen-
sion contributions, pension privatization causes a switch from a front- to a back-loaded tax
structure. On the one hand, this enforces labor supply distortions, on the other hand, a
more progressive tax system increases insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks, which
has a positive effect on long-run welfare and overall efficiency. Next, the loss of annuitiza-
tion provided by the pension system results in a loss of longevity insurance but an increase
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in bequests, whereas the abolition of mandatory savings relaxes liquidity constraints. For
hyperbolic consumers, however, annuitization, mandatory savings and withdrawal restric-
tions constituted a commitment device implicit in the current retirement system. With these
implications in mind, we can now take a step forward to our quantitative results.
Table 4 reports the macroeconomic effects of our privatization reform. In order to finance
pension claims accumulated in the pre-reform years, a permanent payroll tax of (19.5 −
8.4 =) 11.1 percent is required. As lower payroll taxes are substracted from the income tax
base, the consumption tax rate can be permanently reduced by 1.9 percentage points. Due
to the shift in the tax structure, labor supply and employment fall by 0.8 percentage points
initially. Lowering the payroll tax, the additional income available to employees is saved
so that assets increase throughout the transition. Higher savings increase bequest and re-
sources of future generations so that labor supply and employment fall by 4.1 percent in the
long run. Due to rising revenues from income taxation, public debt is reduced gradually
from 60 to 49 percent of GDP. Pension debt, which covers the difference between (reduced)
payroll taxes and benefits for retirees, increases to roughly 223 percent of GDP in the long
run.8 As shown in Table 4, the additional supply of private assets more than compensates
the additional demand of the government and the pension system. Consequently, net for-
eign assets increase from zero to 94 (= 656− 49− 223− 290) percent of GDP which finance
an annual trade balance deficit of 3.1 percent of GDP in the long run.
Table 4: Macroeconomic effects of pension funding
Capital Consump- Pay-
Labor Public Pension tion roll
Period Outputa Assetsb Bequestb debtb debtb taxc taxc
Rational 1 -0.8 351.1d 6.3 60.0d 0.0d -1.9 -8.4
consumers 3 -0.5 411.2 6.6 58.4 57.7 -1.9 -8.4
5 -0.7 477.1 7.3 54.2 117.6 -1.9 -8.4
∞ -4.1 655.9 12.4 49.0 223.2 -1.9 -8.4
Hyperbolic 1 -0.5 351.0d 5.8 60.0d 0.0d -2.0 -8.4
consumers 3 -0.5 417.7 6.1 59.0 57.2 -2.0 -8.4
5 -0.9 489.9 6.9 55.4 117.1 -2.0 -8.4
∞ -4.7 683.4 12.3 51.6 223.9 -2.0 -8.4
aChanges are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium. bIn percent of GDP.
cChanges in percentage points. d Initial long-run equilibrium.
The results for hyperbolic consumers in the lower part of Table 4 are very similar to those
8Braakmann, Gru¨tz and Haug (2007, p. 1173) quantify the implicit debt of the German pension system by
roughly 230 percent of GDP.
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for rational consumers, however, assets increase slightly stronger than before. This is due
to the fact that young hyperbolic consumers discount their very old-age consumption less
than rational consumers. Consequently, they value the previously accumulated pension
entitlements more than rational consumers and react accordingly with their savings. This
finding is in line with the results reported in I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (2003, 769f.) for a closed
economy model, where social security crowds out more capital in the long-run when the
economy is populated by hyperbolic consumers instead of rational ones. Note that the im-
pact on savings is much smaller than in Fehr et al. (2008b), where a quite similar reform
increased savings from 350 to 750 percent of GDP and public debt from 60 to 83 percent
of GDP. Whereas in the previous study capital income was partly exempted from taxation,
the full taxation of capital income in the present study dampens capital accumulation and
increases income tax revenues at the same time so that debt can be reduced.
Table 5 shows for the two benchmark economies the resulting welfare effects of pension
privatization for different cohorts in the reform year and the long run without and with
compensation payments from the LSRA. As already explained above, we first compute the
welfare changes of agents before their productivity is revealed and then derive an aver-
age welfare change for the different productivity types in each cohort of the initial equilib-
rium. Therefore, Table 5 distinguishes in each cohort between ”poor”, ”median”, and ”rich”
households. ”Poor” agents are the 10 percent of the cohort with the lowest realized pro-
ductivity level, ”median” are those 20 percent who realize a medium productivity level and
”rich” are those 20 percent of the cohort with the highest productivity.9 For newborn co-
horts along the transition path we are not able to disaggregate ex-ante welfare effects. Con-
sequently, we report in the middle column the ex-ante welfare change of the whole cohort
and in brackets the (ex-post) welfare changes for ”poor” and ”rich” newborn households
after their productivity is revealed to them.
Due to the reduction in consumption taxes reported in Table 4, welfare of already retired
generations increases up to 0.9 percent of available resources. Note that poor pensioners
benefit slightly more than rich pensioners which reflects their higher consumption propen-
sity. Middle-aged generations, on the other hand, are losing up to 2.7 percent, since – given
the initial implicit tax rates of Figure 1 – the reform effectively raises payroll taxes for these
cohorts (see the discussion of Table 3). In addition, since they retire soon, the eliminated
longevity insurance had the highest benefit for these workers. Since poor households expe-
rience a steeper increase in marginal tax rates than rich households (who might already be
in the top income tax bracket), welfare losses decrease with income level within the middle
cohort. Finally, future generations are gaining roughly 2.5 percent in welfare, as payroll tax
burdens are reduced and bequests increase. Note that poor households realize especially
9For pensioners we aggregate the respective fractions in earning points.
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Table 5: Welfare effects of pension funding∗
Age in Rational consumers Hyperbolic consumers
reform without LSRA with without LSRA with
year poor median rich LSRA poor median rich LSRA
80-84 0.92 0.82 0.73 0.00 0.96 0.87 0.78 0.00
60-64 0.98 0.87 0.76 0.00 1.03 0.91 0.80 0.00
40-44 -2.69 -2.29 -1.29 0.00 -3.25 -2.48 -1.43 0.00
20-24 (1.38) -0.10 (-0.77) 0.21 (0.00) -0.91 (-1.00) -0.82
0-4 (2.55) 1.14 (0.45) 0.21 (1.38) 0.47 (0.30) -0.82
∞ (3.82) 2.46 (1.87) 0.21 (2.78) 1.91 (1.83) -0.82
∗Changes in percent of resources in initial equilibrium.
strong (ex-post) welfare gains in the long run, since their liquidity constraints are relaxed
due to higher bequests and a lower payroll tax rate.
The right part of Table 5 reports the welfare effects in an economy with hyperbolic con-
sumers. We can see that, except for already retired households, welfare decreases compared
to the rational consumer case. This basically reflects the value of the commitment device
included in the current pension system. Already retired households, on the other hand, do
not lose any commitment but still gain from the reduction of the consumption tax rate.
Our long-run welfare results for hyperbolic consumers are in line with the findings of I˙mro-
horog˘lu et al. (2003) in the sense that social security decreases welfare even for hyperbolic
consumers. However, as already discussed in Fehr et al. (2008b), long-run welfare effects are
mainly due to intergenerational redistribution. In order to eliminate these redistributional
effects, we simulate the same pension funding reformwith a LSRA.10 The compensated wel-
fare changes for all generations alive in the initial equilibrium are then zero and newborn
generations experience identical relative welfare increases. As shown in Table 5, the elimi-
nation of social security induces an aggregate efficiency gain of about 0.21 percent of aggre-
gate consumption for rational consumers, which results from relaxed liquidity constraints,
a higher insurance provision through the progressive tax system dominating labor supply
distortions. In the case of hyperbolic consumers we find an aggregate efficiency loss of 0.82
percent. The difference between both calculations - which amounts to roughly 1 percent of
aggregate resources - reflects the value of the commitment technology which implicitly is
provided by social security.11
10We do not report the macroeconomic effects of simulations with compensation payments, but they are
available on request.
11Fehr et al. (2008b) compute significant efficiency losses in both simulations. The difference is due to the
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5.2 Pension funding with IRAs
In this subsection we isolate the different implications of pension funding reported in Table
3 by successively introducing IRAs that exhibit different features of the eliminated pension
system. In order to facilitate the comparison with the previous PAYG-system, we assume an
individual contribution limit which reflects the reduction in payroll taxes, i.e.
sˆj = −Δτ ×min[wj; 2w¯]. (30)
Consequently, contributions are restricted to that fraction of labor income, which in the ini-
tial equilibrium (on average) was saved in the pension system.12 In addition, throughout
the working phase, withdrawal from IRAs is completely forbidden.
In simulation (1) of Table 6 we introduce withdrawal restricted, front-loaded IRAs that are
not annuitized after retirement (i.e. ω = 1). Inheritances from these accounts are taxed at
τb = 0.177, which equals the average marginal income tax rate. We assume that, similar to
public pensions in the benchmark, IRA contributions are tax exempt and withdrawals are
fully taxed (i.e. θ = 0). Therefore, we lose effects 2 and 5 from the pure pension privatization
experiment (see Table 3), i.e. we don’t shift the tax structure to a back-loaded regime any-
more. Hence, there is no more increase in insurance provision through a more progressive
tax system. For hyperbolic consumers we additionally regain some commitment device by
means of withdrawal restrictions during the working phase.
In the short run, labor supply and employment increase for two reasons. First, lack of old age
insurance through annuities results in a stronger need for resources at older ages, i.e. espe-
cially young households work more in order to finance very old age consumption. Second,
medium-aged households who had a high savings share in the pension system in the bench-
mark, compare Figure 1, now suffer from a cut in resources through the age-independent
payroll tax. In order to compensate this reduction and to finance old-age consumption,
they have to increase labor supply. Note that, in the reform without IRAs, this effect was
dominated by the tremendous change in the tax-structure. Due to higher employment, the
payroll tax rate can be reduced by 8.7 percentage points to 10.8 percent. Income tax revenues
hardly change in present value terms compared to the initial equilibrium so that consump-
tion tax rates almost remain constant. As before, labor supply falls during the transition due
to higher bequest, but now income tax revenues fall during the transition so that public debt
full taxation of capital income and the bequest motive in the present study. The reform shifts the tax structure
more towards capital income taxation which improves the insurance provision of the tax system. The bequest
motive dampens the welfare loss from eliminated annuity provision.
12This is similar to the Stakeholder Pension in the UK and the Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs)
in Canada, see Disney et al. (2009) and Milligan (2003).
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Table 6: Macroeconomic effects of IRAs
Capital Consump-
Labor IRA Public Pension tion
Period Outputa Assetsb Bequestb sharec debtb debtb taxc, f
(1) Tax deferred, but not annuitized accounts (θ = 0,ω = 1)
Rational 1 1.8 351.1d 6.1 0.0 60.0d 0.0d -0.1
consumers 3 0.6 419.5 6.6 13.3 58.1 56.9 -0.1
5 0.2 497.1 7.5 25.2 59.6 116.7 -0.1
∞ -2.0 706.8 13.7 44.2 82.4 220.4 -0.1
Hyperbolic 1 2.1 351.0d 5.6 0.0 60.0d 0.0d -0.2
consumers 3 0.9 425.2 6.1 13.6 58.7 56.4 -0.2
5 0.3 510.6 7.1 25.4 61.0 116.0 -0.2
∞ -2.4 736.9 13.7 45.4 87.7 220.5 -0.2
(2) Tax deferred and annuitized accounts (θ = ω = 0)
Rational 1 1.0 351.1d 6.1 0.0 60.0d 0.0d 0.0
consumers 3 0.5 414.1 6.3 13.6 58.5 57.1 0.0
5 -0.2 484.5 6.4 25.1 58.8 117.4 0.0
∞ -0.5 601.3 6.2 42.6 65.9 219.4 0.0
Hyperbolic 1 1.5 351.0d 5.6 0.0 60.0d 0.0d -0.1
consumers 3 0.7 418.5 5.8 14.0 58.5 56.8 -0.1
5 -0.1 491.7 6.0 25.7 59.2 116.8 -0.1
∞ -0.6 610.2 5.5 44.8 67.5 219.2 -0.1
(2b) Mandatory accounts
Rational 1 1.0 351.1d 6.1 0.0 60.0d 0.0d 0.2
consumers 3 0.1 419.0 6.3 14.2 58.3 57.1 0.2
5 -0.7 493.8 6.4 26.2 59.2 117.7 0.2
∞ -1.1 618.1 5.9 45.9 70.2 220.1 0.2
Hyperbolic 1 1.1 351.0d 5.7 0.0 60.0d 0.0d 0.2
consumers 3 0.1 419.2 5.8 14.2 58.1 56.9 0.2
5 -0.7 493.2 5.9 26.2 58.9 117.6 0.2
∞ -0.9 613.3 5.4 46.4 69.0 220.6 0.2
aChanges are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium. bIn percent of GDP.
cChanges in percentage points. d Initial long-run equilibrium. f Payroll tax: -8.7 percentage points.
increases significantly. However, since savings rise much stronger than in Table 4, which re-
sults from the tax advantages of IRAs, foreign assets are higher in the long run compared to
the previous simulation. The share of IRAs in total assets roughly reaches 45 percent in the
long run. Note that IRAs are (slightly) more attractive for hyperbolic than for rational con-
sumers which is due to the commitment device provided by restricted withdrawal during
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employment.
Next, in simulations (2) of Table 6, we introduce accounts which in addition are annuitized
after retirement (i.e. θ = ω = 0), i.e. beneath effects 2 and 5, we also eliminate the loss of
annuitization in Table 3. Annuities provide an insurance against longevity but at the same
time such assets could not be left to descendants. Given the strong bequest motive of the
present calibration, the negative effects dominate so that the IRA share is reduced especially
for rational consumers. Since young households now have the possibility to insure against
longevity risk through IRA contributions, there is no more need for extra resources at old
ages which reduces their labor supply compared to simulation (1). Note, however, that
medium-aged consumers still increase their labor supply due to the strong income effect,
which results in a moderate increase in employment in the short-run. In the medium and
long run, their is no more increase in bequests, which dampens the decrease of labor supply
and the increase in assets compared to the previous simulation. Therefore, our results are in
contrast to Fuster et al. (2008), where annuitization increases long-run asset accumulation
since young generations directly benefit from the insurance provision given to their parents.
Table 7 reports how cohorts contribute to retirement accounts in the new long-run equilib-
rium. People first have to build up precautionary savings against income uncertainty or
would like to borrow against future income. Consequently, younger cohorts in the lowest
income class do not contribute to the accounts at all, while only individuals in the top in-
come class save up to the contribution limit. Participation rates increase with age, which is
consistent with empirical evidence and the results from Love (2007). Note, however, that
low income households contribute much less than middle and high income individuals. In
the lowest income class nobody saves up to the contribution limit, whereas on average, up
to 50 percent of a cohort contribute as much as possible. Finally, hyperbolic households save
more in the accounts, especially at young ages, since they benefit from the commitment
technology.
Table 7: Participation in retirement accounts (in %)
Rational households Hyperbolic households
Lowest income class All classes All classes
0 < sj < sˆj 0 < sj < sˆj 0 < sj < sˆj
Age sj = 0 sj = sˆj sj = 0 sj = sˆj sj = 0 sj = sˆj
20-29 100 0 0 25 45 30 15 45 40
30-39 76 24 0 8 50 42 6 51 43
40-49 33 67 0 3 46 51 2 48 50
50-59 36 64 0 6 49 45 6 50 44
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As reported in Boeri, Bo¨rsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, p. 29), especially in Europe many
people seem to favor a system of mandatory instead of voluntary accounts. One explana-
tion might be that they want to reduce their own self-control problems. Consequently, in
simulations (2b) of Table 6, we additionally make IRA savings mandatory, i.e the individual
decision about sj is completely eliminated and everybody is forced to contribute sˆj to the
accounts. Consequently, only effect 1 of the pension privatization exercise remains, see Ta-
ble 3. As households now are forced to contribute to IRAs, aggregate savings and especially
the IRA share increase compared to the respective benchmark simulation (2), while bequest
slightly fall in the long run. Since higher contributions are subtracted from the tax base,
income tax revenues fall and the consumption tax rate increases marginally. As contribu-
tions now distort labor supply, employment falls more than in the previous simulation (2).
Note that the reaction of hyperbolic consumers is slightly dampened compared to rational
ones. Since they already contribute more in the accounts voluntarily, they are affected less
by mandatory savings.
Table 8 reports welfare and efficiency effects of the simulations with IRAs. Tax deferred and
withdrawal restricted accounts in simulations (1) have three central consequences. First, al-
ready retired households are hardly affected, since the consumption tax rate now almost
remains constant. Second, tax deferral is mostly beneficial for rich households. Conse-
quently, middle-aged rich households lose less than middle-aged poor and median house-
holds. Third, compared to Table 5, aggregate efficiency gains decrease slightly for rational
consumers, since tax deferral reduces the insurance provision of the tax system. For hy-
perbolic consumers, however, efficiency losses are substantially lower than in Table 5, since
they now benefit from the commitment technology of the IRAs.13
When withdrawals from IRAs are annuitized in simulations (2), long-run welfare gains fall
due to the reduction of unintended bequest.14 On the other hand, aggregate efficiency in-
creases significantly, since annuitized accounts now include a longevity insurance formerly
provided by social security. Note that the efficiency increase is much stronger for hyperbolic
consumers. Annuitization strengthens commitment effects as withdrawals are completely
regulated in retirement periods. Since now the IRA system almost provides an identical
commitment technology as the original pension system, aggregate efficiency is the same for
13We also simulated the introduction of fully taxed IRAs (i.e. θ = ω = 1). For rational consumers this has
no consequences compared to section 4.1, but hyperbolic consumers value the commitment technology due to
reduced liquidity and save in IRAs. As a result, the aggregate efficiency loss is reduced from 0.82 percent (in
Table 5) to 0.64 percent.
14Again, this is in contrast to Fuster et al. (2008) who apply a different preference structure. Fehr and
Habermann (2008b) show that in the present model long-run welfare falls due to annuitization as long as the
population growth rate is lower than the interest rate.
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Table 8: Welfare effects of IRAs∗
Age in Rational consumers Hyperbolic consumers
reform without LSRA with without LSRA with
year poor median rich LSRA poor median rich LSRA
(1) Tax deferred, but not annuitized accounts (θ = 0,ω = 1)
80-84 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.00
60-64 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.00
40-44 -2.68 -2.10 -1.13 0.00 -3.09 -2.10 -0.95 0.00
20-24 (1.52) 0.50 (0.44) 0.13 (0.58) 0.14 (0.64) -0.29
0-4 (2.62) 1.65 (1.57) 0.13 (1.96) 1.53 (1.96) -0.29
∞ (3.86) 2.94 (2.95) 0.13 (3.36) 2.98 (3.53) -0.29
(2) Tax deferred and annuitized accounts (θ = ω = 0)
80-84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00
60-64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.00
40-44 -1.73 -1.32 -0.79 0.00 -1.89 -1.24 -0.56 0.00
20-24 (2.08) 1.31 (1.50) 0.67 (1.42) 1.34 (2.00) 0.68
0-4 (2.05) 1.27 (1.47) 0.67 (1.33) 1.26 (1.93) 0.68
∞ (1.96) 1.18 (1.37) 0.67 (1.16) 1.09 (1.75) 0.68
(2b) Mandatory accounts
80-84 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 0.00
60-64 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 0.00
40-44 -1.89 -1.41 -0.83 0.00 -2.05 -1.45 -0.85 0.00
20-24 (0.22) 0.75 (1.35) 0.02 (0.35) 1.02 (1.74) 0.12
0-4 (0.14) 0.66 (1.26) 0.02 (0.24) 0.90 (1.64) 0.12
∞ (0.00) 0.50 (1.09) 0.02 (0.05) 0.71 (1.44) 0.12
∗Changes in percent of resources in initial equilibrium.
rational and hyperbolic consumers. The reported efficiency effects are due to (positive) liq-
uidity effects and higher labor supply distortions. However, the increase in labor supply
distortions is fairly small.15
With mandatory accounts in simulations (2b), all cohorts are worse off compared to the re-
spective benchmark simulations (2). Of course, since borrowing constraints bite stronger
with mandatory contributions, especially poor households experience a welfare loss. Not
surprisingly, the introduction of mandatory accounts would completely eliminate the previ-
ous aggregate efficiency gain. This also holds for sophisticated hyperbolic consumers who
save optimally in self-commiting accounts on their own.16
15In order to eliminate any labor supply distortions, we simulated the reform (2) with age-specific payroll
tax rates computed from (29) and compensate the resulting liquidity effects by lump-sum transfers. Aggregate
efficiency gains then increase to 0.75 and 0.79 for rational and hyperbolic consumers, respectively.
16Note that it would be no problem to go one step further and also eliminate the last effect of Table 3 by
27
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Next we present some sensitivity analysis for the benchmark simulations (2) considered in
the previous subsection. We concentrate on rational consumers17 and assume (if not stated
otherwise) a small open economy, i.e. we always start from an equilibrium which features
the same interest rate and capital-output ratio as reported in Table 1. Of course, households’
savings are different in the initial equilibrium. Consequently, net foreign assets and net
exports are non-zero. For a better comparison, in the first line of Table 9, we again report the
already explained benchmark results from the previous subsection.
In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we follow Epstein and Zin
(1991) and rewrite the preference structure (9) of the representative consumer by
V (zj,Zt) =
{
u(cj, j) + δ
[
ψj+1EV (·) + (1− ψj+1)B(qj+1)
]} 1
1− 1γ , with
EV (·) =
[∫
Ej+1
V (·)1−ηΠj(dej+1|ej)
] 1− 1γ
1−η
and u(cj, j) =
[
(cj)
1− 1ρ + α(j)
1− 1ρ
] 1− 1γ
1− 1ρ .
The parameter η defines the degree of (relative) risk aversion. For the special case η = 1γ
we are back at the traditional expected utility specification discussed above, see Epstein and
Zin (1991, p. 266). Consequently, setting relative risk aversion η = 2.0 yields the benchmark
equilibria reported in Table 1 and the welfare effects of Table 5. Typically, values between 1
and 5 for η are perceived as reasonable in the literature, see Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (2000,
p. 792) for a discussion.
The considered benchmark reform (2) increases the taxation of precautionary savings (due
to higher marginal income tax rates) and shifts the distortion of labor supply from younger
towards older ages (due to the flat payroll tax rate). Consequently, precautionary savings
are dampened and labor supply is substituted towards younger ages. When we assume in
Table 9 that the economy is populated by risk neutral consumers (i.e. η = 0.0), there is no
precautionary savings motive so that, compared to the benchmark (2), mainly regular sav-
ings increase. Rising bequests explain higher long-run welfare gains. Higher efficiency gains
are due to a stronger liquidity effect, since in the absence of a precautionary savings motive
risk neutral consumers are more constrained in the initial equilibrium. Next we return to
employing age-specific tax and contribution rates. With such a reform, there would not be any change in
macroeconomic variables and welfare throughout the transition.
17Results for hyperbolic consumers are available upon request. The direction of the effects is always the
same as for rational consumers. However, aggregate efficiency effects are harder to interpret, since the initial
equilibrium now differs considerably.
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis for rational consumers
Changes in long-run
open regular IRA/
η γ ρ μ economy output assets GDP bequest welfare efficiency
2.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 yes -0.5 -2.2∗ 256.7∗ -1.3∗ 1.18 0.67
0.0 -0.5 0.9 241.5 1.6 1.27 0.77
0.33 -0.7 0.5 239.6 2.4 1.74 1.25
0.1 -0.4 -2.8 265.3 -2.6 1.47 0.93
0.0 -0.7 -6.8 266.8 -8.9 1.06 0.52
no 0.8 -1.6 245.7 -3.4 1.38 0.38
∗ This figure can be computed from the information given in Table 6.
the original assumption about risk aversion and assume that the intertemporal substitution
elasticity γ is reduced from 0.5 to 0.33. The optimal consumption profile now becomes flatter
so that liquidity constraints in the initial equilibrium are binding stronger and people need
less resources at retirement. Consequently, old-age savings in IRAs are shifted towards pre-
cautionary savings so that future generations gain significantly due to higher bequests. The
higher efficiency gain is due to the stronger liquidity effect. Next we vary the labor supply
elasticity and reduce the intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ from 0.6 to 0.1 in order to
approach the fixed labor supply case. Now, goods consumption is stronger bound towards
leisure. As a consequence, at retirement – where leisure equals the time endowment – peo-
ple need more resources so that regular savings are substituted for IRA savings. Although
bequests are now reduced compared to the benchmark, long-run welfare as well as effi-
ciency increase due to lower labor supply distortions. Similarly, regular savings are shifted
towards IRA accounts, when the bequest motive is eliminated. Bequests fall significantly,
but long-run welfare is only marginally reduced, since people benefit from higher longevity
insurance. Aggregate efficiency is reduced, since higher IRA savings reduce tax progres-
sion so that the insurance provision of the tax system falls. Finally, we turn to the closed
economy case where wages increase and the interest rate falls throughout the transition. Of
course, higher wages increase the welfare of future generations. However, aggregate effi-
ciency gains are lower compared to the benchmark, since liquidity constraints are reduced
less in this case.
6 Discussion
The present paper applies a general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic income risk and
liquidity constraints to analyze the substitution of the pension system in Germany by indi-
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vidual retirement accounts. Extending our previous work in Fehr, Habermann and Kinder-
mann (2008) we compute transitional growth and welfare effects as well as aggregate effi-
ciency consequences of pension funding with alternative IRA designs. The following results
seem to be important not only for the policy discussion in Germany: First, we quantify the
implicit commitment technology embedded in social security by roughly 1 percent of aggre-
gate resources. The commitment technology could be fully included in IRAs if the latter are
annuitized. Second, despite the fact that our consumers have an operative bequest motive,
welfare gains from the (implicit) longevity insurance of the pension system are significant
and range from roughly 0.5 to 1.0 percent of aggregate resources for rational and hyperbolic
consumers, respectively. Third, mandatory annuitization does not come without cost. In
our model it reduces unintended bequest so that future generations are significantly hurt.
Finally, our results highlight the importance of liquidity effects for social security analysis.
An IRA system might be able to obtain these efficiency gains without requiring age-specific
contribution rates as in Priest (2006) or Hurst and Willen (2007). However, liquidity gains
could only be maximized with voluntary and not with mandatory accounts.
Some assumptions of our study deserve specific comments. First, in reality, a complete
switch to a funded pension system seems to be hardly practical. Even Chile runs a two-tier
system where minimum pensions are financed on a paygo basis. So-called ”Riester pen-
sions” in Germany are intended to substitute only a fraction of the public system and all
U.S. proposals for an investment-based account system keep a major part of the existing so-
cial security. Consequently, our complete privatization exercise mainly serves a pedagogic
purpose. Any arbitrary partial privatization would only change the quantitative results, but
not our central policy conclusions. Second, in our model, mandatory annuitization is only
assumed because it is computationally less demanding. Since annuities could be bought at
actuarially fair prices, all individuals would choose to annuitize their retirement savings.
Modeling an explicit decision to annuitize as in Brown (2001) or Bu¨tler and Teppa (2007)
would require a load factor for annuities (which would be no problem), heterogenous pref-
erences and mortality risks on the household side. This is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Third, our analysis could be extended to a more progressive social security system.
If the newly established individual accounts eliminate intra-generational redistribution, it is
possible to generate additional efficiency gains from reduced labor market distortions. But
as shown by Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008), it is also possible to design progressive ac-
counts which keep the intragenerational redistribution unchanged. In this case our analysis
could be directly applied. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that our study abstracts
from means-tested minimum pensions. In reality governments guarantee to bail out re-
tirees without resources so that it is optimal for some individuals not to prepare for old age
and rely on minimum pensions instead. This so-called prodigality provides a strong case
for mandatory pension systems. As Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004) have demonstrated,
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mandatory savings accounts could overcome the moral hazard problem and improve effi-
ciency if withdrawals are allowed during low income periods. In our future research, we
plan to address the problem of means-testing.
Appendix A: Computational method
In order to compute a solution we discretize the state space. The state of a household
is determined by zj = (aj, aRj , epj, ej) ∈ A × R × P × Ej where A = {a1, . . . , anA}, R =
{aR,1, . . . , aR,nR}, P = {ep1, . . . , epnP} and Ej = {e1j , . . . , enEj } are discrete sets. We use nA =
nR = 20, nP = 15 and nE = 6, but we have also simulated the model with more grid
points without significant consequences for the reported results. For all these possible states
zj we compute the optimal decision of households from (8). The pension grid is equidis-
tant while the asset grid has increasing intervals between two grid points. Since u(cj, j)
is not differentiable in every (cj, j) and V (zj+1) is only known in a discrete set of points
zj+1 ∈ A× R× P× Ej+1, this maximization problem can not be solved analytically. There-
fore we have to use the following numerical maximization and interpolation algorithms to
compute households optimal decision:
1. Compute (8) in age J for all possible zJ . Notice that V (zJ+1) = 0 and households are
not allowed to work anymore. Due to the bequest motive, they only have to decide
how much they want to bequeath.
2. For j = J − 1, . . . , 1:
Find (8) for all possible zj by using Powell’s algorithm (Press et. al., 2001, 406ff.). Since
this algorithm requires a continuous function, we have to interpolate V (zj+1). Having
computed the data V (zj+1) for all zj+1 ∈ {j + 1} × A× R× P× Ej+1 in the last step,
we can now find a function spj+1 which satisfies the interpolation conditions
spj+1(akj+1, a
R,l
j+1, ep
m
j+1) = EV (zj+1) (31)
for all k = 1, . . . , nA, l = 1, . . . , nR andm = 1, . . . , nP. In this paper we use multidimen-
sional linear interpolation.
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Appendix B: Markov transition matrices
Age dependent Markov transition matrices
Age 20-24 Age 25-29
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.11
2 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.11
Current 3 0.07 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.09
productivity 4 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.31 0.22 0.09
level 5 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.24
6 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.46
Age 30-34 Age 35-39
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.05
2 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.02
Current 3 0.09 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.38 0.20 0.09 0.05
productivity 4 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.40 0.22 0.07
level 5 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.44 0.22
6 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.23 0.58 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.63
Age 40-44 Age 45-49
Future productivity level Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.49 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.45 0.26 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01
2 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.03
Current 3 0.07 0.13 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.44 0.27 0.07 0.02
productivity 4 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.40 0.29 0.06
level 5 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.46 0.20
6 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.66 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.70
Age 50-54
Future productivity level
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.42 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.04
2 0.14 0.30 0.35 0.11 0.06 0.04
Current 3 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.25 0.11 0.03
productivity 4 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.41 0.24 0.07
level 5 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.45 0.19
6 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.66
Source: Authors’ own calculations from 1988-2003 SOEP data
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